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Abstract
Enron and other corporate financial scandals focused attention on the accounting industry in general and
on Arthur Andersen in particular. Part of the policy response to Enron, the criminal prosecution of Andersen,
eliminated one of the few major audit firms capable of auditing many large, public corporations. This article
explores whether Andersen’s performance, as measured by frequency of financial restatements, measurably differed
from that of other large auditors. Financial restatements trigger significant negative market reactions and their
frequency can be viewed as a measure of accounting performance. We analyze the financial restatement activity of
approximately 1,000 large, public firms from 1997 through 2001. After controlling for client size, region, time, and
industry, we find no evidence that Andersen’s performance significantly differed from that of other large accounting
firms

This article is about accounting firm performance and its implications for the
state of product differentiation and corporate governance in the accounting industry.
We investigate whether a serious sign of accounting failure, the substantive restatement
of earnings by large, publicly held companies, occurs with similar frequency across the
major accounting firms, or whether restatements tend to be isolated in particular
miscreant firms, particularly the late Arthur Andersen (“Andersen”).
Some of the governmental responses and initiatives to the wave of Enron-style
corporate collapses reflect the view that Andersen, Enron’s auditor, was an outlier
among accounting firms. Other government actions, however, reflect the view that the
major accounting firms are more or less the same. For example, Andersen’s internal
corporate governance, monitoring, and control systems may have been weak relative to
those of the other large accounting firms, and this lack of internal controls may have
made Andersen particularly vulnerable to “capture” by unscrupulous clients.
Alternatively, it may be the case that all of the large accounting firms are similar in the
sense that all are equally susceptible to internal corporate governance problems, and all
have, more or less, the same quality of internal controls. If so, then all firms should be
equally susceptible to the possibility that client firms will capture the teams of auditors
assigned to prepare financial statements, and cause these accountants to acquiesce in
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inappropriately aggressive accounting treatment, or even to pro-actively participate in
the design of materially misleading accounting statements.
The stakes of accurately describing Andersen’s performance are high.
Remarkably few large accounting firms audit multiple large, public corporations.
Removing a major firm from such a thin market has implications for the public
securities markets as well as for the accounting industry. Independent of Andersen’s
particular performance, the stakes of understanding the pattern of financial restatements
are also high. Restatements have been shown to trigger substantial drops in restating
firms’ market value. Examining restatements, which reflect on the quality of a major
product of accounting firms–their public company audits, may also foster insights about
the relation between large companies and their auditors and about the internal
governance of auditors.
Analysis of about 1,000 large, public firms from 1997-2001 yields no evidence
that accounting profession problems that lead to restatements were unique to Andersen.
Andersen’s clients did not restate their financial results at a significantly different rate
than the other major accounting firms during this period. During the period of our
study, private plaintiffs and government regulators began to focus more intensively on
accounting irregularities and the percentage of public companies restating their financial
results increased dramatically. Interestingly, however, we do not find a significant rise
in Andersen’s share of the increased number of restatements. Rather, the distribution
or restatements among the largest accounting firms remained roughly the same.
Thus, by the restatement-rate measure, the vilified and now-defunct Andersen
was not objectively different from the other major accounting firms. Whether our
findings mean that Andersen was not as bad as it was perceived to have been, or
whether they mean that the other big accounting firms were worse than was generally
thought is a matter of interpretation for the reader. To the extent, however, that
financial restatement rates are a key measure of audit firm performance, one may
question the prosecutorial judgment to end Arthur Andersen’s existence by bringing
criminal charges against it. Our findings also call into question the value of market
competition in generating successful product differentiation, at least among the largest
accounting firms. Our results do suggest that the accounting reforms implemented by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which apply to all accounting firms, can be defended
on the ground that accounting profession problems are industry-wide and not linked to
any particular firm.
To the extent that financial restatement rates capture an important component
of accounting firm quality, we find little evidence that the top accounting firms compete
with one another on the basis of quality.
Part I of this article discusses the law and economics of accounting, and provides
the relevant background to our analysis. Part II describes the data and reports the
empirical results. Part III of the paper discusses the results. A conclusion follows.
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I. The Law and Economics of Accounting
A. The Paradigm
The law and economics literature has a simple and elegant explanation for the
importance of independent accounting firms.1 Generating information about financial
results is important for internal as well as external reasons. Management needs to know
how the firm is performing, and therefore needs accurate, reliable information on
financial performance. However, all of the information that management needs can
(and is) generated by firms internally. Demand for the services of independent outsiders
to audit this information exists because firms need a credible signal that they can send
to outside investors that the financial results being reported are, in fact, accurate.
Thus, outside auditors do not perform any services for a company that the
company does not already perform for itself. The role of the auditor is not to prepare
financial reports for clients (that is the role of the accountant). Rather, the auditor’s role
is to provide a reliable verification of the company’s financial reports.
Thus, auditor reputation is central to the standard economic theory of auditing.
Only auditors with reputations for honesty and integrity are valuable to audit-clients.
The idea is that, absent a reputation for honesty and integrity, the auditor’s verification
function loses its value. In theory, then, auditors invest heavily in creating and
maintaining their reputations for performing honest, high quality audits. High quality
audits by independent auditors who have good reputations are assured. The quality
assurance is derived from the fact that performing poor-quality audits diminishes the
value of the audit firm’s investment in reputation.2
The pre-Enron law and economics view of the accounting industry predicted that
accounting firms compete in a “race-to-the-top” that provides them with incentives to
strive to produce high quality audits:
1

The classic article is Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman. 1983, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory
of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J. Law and Econ. 613 (1983); see also Antle, Auditor Independence, 22
J. Accounting Research 1-20 (1984); George Benston, Accountant’s Integrity and Financial Reporting,
Financial Executive, August, 1975, 10-14. 1975; S. Choi & D. Jeter, The Effect of Qualified Audit
Opinions on Earnings Response Coefficients, 15 J. Accounting and Econ. 229-248 (1992).

2

B.W. Mahew, Auditor Reputation Building, 39 J. Accounting Research 599-617 (2001); B.W. Mahew,
J.W. Schatzberg, and G.R. Sevcik, The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on
Auditor Objectivity, Auditing a Journal of Practice and Theory 49-70 (2001); R.R. King, Reputation
Formatrion for Reliable Reporting: An Experimental Investigation, 71 The Accounting Rev. 375-96
(1996); George Benston, The Value of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 The
Accounting Rev., 515 (1969); Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 1; R. Antle, Auditor Independence, 22
J. Accounting Research 1 (1984); N. Macintosh, T. Shearer, D. Thornton, and M Welker, Financial
Accounting as Simulacrum and Hyper-reality: Perspectives on Income and Capital, Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Jan. 2000 at 13.
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There was a time that the audit function was carried out in a
market environment that induced high quality financial reporting. In
that era, accounting firms were willing to put their seal of approval on
the financial records of a client company only if the company agreed to
conform to the high standards imposed by the accounting profession.
Investors trusted accountants because investors knew that any
accounting firm that was sloppy or corrupt could not stay in business for
long. Auditors had significant incentives to ‘do superior work’ because
‘auditors with strong reputations could command a fee premium, and
high fees ‘signaled quality in the auditing market.”3
High quality audit services were further assured by the audit firms’
independence from their clients, where independence is measured by the percentage of
an audit firm’s billings that are derived from a particular client.4 In a world in which
auditors have both invested in developing high quality reputations and in which no
single client represents more than a tiny fraction of total billings, high audit quality
seems assured. Under these conditions, any potential gain to an auditor from
performing a shoddy audit, much less from participating in a client’s fraud, would be
vastly outweighed by the diminution in value to the auditor’s reputation.
In sum, even though companies can (and do) audit themselves, they can justify
the expense of hiring outside auditors to enhance their financial reputation and
credibility with a wide range of current and prospective claimants on their cash flows,
including investors, suppliers, customers, prospective employees. Under this
reputational model, companies need independent audits to attract outside capital,
because it is widely believed that an auditing firm that discovers a problem would insist
on a correction or, ultimately, fire the client. Being fired by an accounting firm has
serious implications for the client.5 The accounting firm that dismissed the audit client,
however, would lose only that client. And even this loss probably could well be offset

3

Jonathan Macey & Hillary Sale, “Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and
Governance in the Accounting Industry,” 48 Villanova L. Rev. 1167, 1168 (2003).
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For example, Andersen was said to be independent of Enron because Andersen had 2300 other audit
clients, and Enron accounted for only about one percent of Andersen’s total revenue from auditing
(Andersen’s Enron’s revenues were reported in 2001 as $100 million as compared to $9.34 billion in 2001
audit revenue). Id. at 1176, n. 33. Of course, Andersen’s independence as a firm did not extend to the
partners responsible for doing the actual audit work for Enron. See id. at 1168.
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See, e.g. Martin Fackler, How Auditors Got the Nerve to Defy Big Japanese Bank, Aug. 6, 2003, Wall
St. J. at A1 (describing how auditors’ failure to sign off on financial projections of a large Japanese bank
caused a crisis that forced the bank to seek a $17 billion government bailout that put the financial
institution under government control).
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as the accounting firm might well gain new clients by virtue of the enhancement in the
reputation of the accounting firm that followed from firing the client.
So, even though companies can and do impose their own financial controls and
audit themselves, they hire outside auditors to capitalize on the audit firm’s reputation.
Hiring an auditor, at least in theory, allows the client company to “rent” the reputation
of the accounting firm, which rents its’ reputation for care, honesty and integrity to its
clients. This, in a nutshell, is the economic theory of the demand for the services of
independent auditors.
In theory, then, accounting firms are willing to put their seal of approval on a
company’s financial records only if the company agrees to conform to the high
standards imposed by the accounting profession. Investors trust accountants because
investors know that any accounting firm that is sloppy or corrupt could not stay in
business for long. The long-term loss to the reputation of an independent accounting
firm that does slipshod or fraudulent work is much greater than any possible short-term
gains the accounting firm might get by cutting corners. Companies that refuse to comply
with the auditors’ demands for transparency and simplicity in reporting risk being
dismissed by their auditors. Being fired by an accounting firm sends a negative signal
to investors that often both devastates a company and leads to the dismissal of top
management. Outside audits send a strong signal to investors that the company’s
financial house was in order.
From the perspective of audit firms’ clients, good audits are good investments
because they reduce the cost of capital and increase shareholder wealth. Good audits
also increase management’s credibility among the investment community. In theory,
the capital markets audit the auditors:
Public accountants knew they had a lot to lose if their clients’
information turned out to be false or misleading. Auditors who did a
superior job would reduce the chance of their clients’ issuing unreliable
information and so reduce their own risk of being sued by aggrieved
investors. Such suits are costly to auditors; even unsuccessful suits
damage their valuable reputations.6
From an empirical perspective, researchers have not, to date, at tempted to test
whether the largest accounting firms can be distinguished on the basis of quality. Some
evidence, however, supports the idea that the largest accounting firms are superior in
quality to the smaller firms. For example, Frances, Maydew and Sparks found that
earnings management, as reflected in discretionary accruals tend to be larger among

6

Daniel B. Thornton, Financial Reporting Quality: Implications of Accounting Research, Submission to
the Senate (Canada) Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Study on the State of
Domestic and International Financial System. May 29, 2002.
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non-Big Six clients than among audit clients of the Big Six firms, and others have
obtained similar results.7
B. Did Something Go Wrong?
It is generally thought that something went awry in the accounting profession.8
However the data we produce in this paper is consistent only with the view that there
are no major distinctions among the big accounting firms with respect to quality that we
were able to detect. Our findings are consistent both with the view that all of the big
accounting firms all are doing excellent work as well as with the view that all of the
firms are doing poor work.
Several factors may have contributed to the perceived decline in audit quality.
The shift of organizational form from the general partnership form to the Limited
Liability Partnership form reduced the threat of liability faced by audit firm partners not
directly involved in auditing a particular client. This, in turn, may have resulted in a
diminution in the incentives of accounting firm partners to monitor the performance of
their colleagues. The removal of aider and abettor liability risk also may have, at the
margin, reduced auditors’ incentives to monitor one another,9 a reduction in incentives
that was exacerbated in 1995 by passage of the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA).10
7

J.R. Francis, E.L. Maydew, & H.C. Sparks, “The Role of Big Six Auditors in the Credible Reporting
of Accruals,” 18 Auditing, A Journal of Practice & Theory, 17-34 (1999); C.L. Becker, M.L. DeFond,
J. Jiambalvo, and K.R. Subramanyan, The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management,” 15
Contemporary Accounting Research, 1 (1998).
8

According to a 2002 Gallup poll, 70% of U.S. investors stated that business accounting issues were
hurting the investment climate "a lot." Data reported in November 14, 2002 speech by SEC Commissioner
Paul Atkins, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111402psa.html.

9

Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that Section
10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibit only “the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the
commission of a manipulative act” and do not prohibit the aiding and abetting of such acts). This decision
was thought to have alleviated substantially the legal risks to outside advisors such as auditors and
lawyers.
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Public Law 104-67, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78. The PSLRA established new rules of pleading that
require plaintiffs’ complaints to “state with particularity all facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind” when making a misstatement or omission in financial
reporting. The PSLRA also delayed the beginning of discovery until after a court has decided whether
to allow the case to go forward on the basis of the heightened pleading standards. Prior to passage of the
PSLRA, plaintiffs’ attorneys could begin to gather documents and interview witnesses as soon as their
complaint was filed. PSLRA also sharply limited the doctrine of “joint and several liability,” which
insures that victims can recover full damages even if one or more of the parties to the fraud cannot pay.
Under PSLRA, those whose reckless misconduct contributes to the fraud can be held responsible for only
their proportionate share of victims' losses. As a result, when the primary perpetrator of the fraud is

6

These changes, may have been exacerbated by the increasing complexity
involved in performing audits. Auditing became more complex as new and more
sophisticated methods of financing proliferated, and as the audit rules themselves
became more technical and complex. As a consequence, audit firms that were engaged
by large public companies found that the “audit engagement teams” they assigned to
perform audits had to spend increasingly large percentages of their time performing
audit services for that client. Thus, for example the head of Andersen’s Enron audit
team spent 100 percent of his time on the Enron account.11 This, in turn, led to the
capture of auditors by their clients, since auditors’ careers
increasingly came to depend entirely on the “care and feeding” of single clients. Thus,
just as the danger of client “capture” of auditors was increasing, the incentives of
accounting firms to develop internal corporate governance structures to combat capture
may have been decreasing due to the passage of statutes providing limited liability to
accounting firm partners.
The danger of client capture appears to have been exacerbated by the growth in
the provision of highly profitable consulting services by auditors. If consulting services
accounting firms offer to their audit clients have higher profit margins than auditing
services, accounting firms will be tempted to use auditing work either as a loss leader
or as a mechanism for “’opening the door’ with a client for the purpose of pitching their
(higher margin) consulting services.”12 Providing consulting services further erodes
auditor independence by shifting the balance of power away from the auditor and in the
direction of the audit client when auditors are discussing audit work and retention
issues. Worse, consulting services provide a means by which audit clients can reward
auditors for succumbing to the client’s wishes about what accounting treatment should
be used to report novel or complex transactions and business practices.13
Where auditors only offer clients audit services, the client’s only option is to fire
the auditor if the client does not think that the auditor is being sufficiently aggressive
or compliant. But when the accountants also are peddling consulting services, the client
can employ a “carrot and stick” strategy that rewards the accounting firm for being
compliant and punishes the firm for being inflexible.14 This pressure is particularly
acute in an environment in which the firm is the only client of the engagement partner
bankrupt, investors cannot fully recover their losses from other entities, such as accounting firms.
11

Macey & Sale, supra note 3.

12

Id. at 1178.

13

Id. (discussing conversation with Jeffrey Gordon).

14

This “carrot and stick” strategy may also be employed by auditors in their delivery of audit services,
since the auditor has ways of making audits more or less intrusive, and more or less expensive for audit
clients, depending on the amount of interviewing and random sampling the auditor does. However the
audit function is sufficiently routine that this sort of strategy may be difficult to implement.
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from the accounting firm that is performing the audit, since a partner’s inability to
procure lucrative consulting work would be reflected in the salary, promotion, and
bonuses of the partner.
As John Coffee has observed, it is difficult for an audit client to fire its auditor
because such dismissals invite “potential public embarrassment, public disclosure of the
reason for the auditor’s dismissal or resignation, and potential SEC intervention.”15 By
contrast, where a company is both an audit client as well as a consulting client of a
particular accounting firm, “the client can easily terminate the auditor as a consultant
or reduce its use of the firm’s consulting services, in retaliation for the auditor’s
intransigence.”16 When the client terminates the high margin consulting services
provided by the accounting firm and retains only the low margin auditing services, there
is no need to make any public disclosure. This means that there is no risk that firing the
auditor from a consulting engagement will provoke heightened scrutiny from investors,
the SEC or plaintiffs’ class action law firms.
Another major complaint about accounting firms has been about the quality of
their own internal corporate governance. The inability or unwillingness of officials in
Andersen’s head office in Chicago to monitor and control the auditors in the field has
been highlighted in the securities class action litigation that has followed in the wake
of Enron. Carl Bass, an Andersen partner and member of that firm’s Professional
Standards Group, was apparently removed from the Andersen Professional Standards
Group when he tried to correct accounting errors in Enron’s financial reporting. It also
appears that accounting partners at Andersen were able “to ignore with impunity the
advice provided by higher level, more objective experts within the firm” and that these
higher level officials were unwilling or unable to assert their authority by following
through to insure that their recommendations were followed.17 It appears that the
Enron-Andersen relation really was an example of an accounting firm captured by its
audit client:
A number of surviving Arthur Andersen documents reveal that Arthur
Andersen was concerned about, yet covered up or ignored fraudulent
accounting practices by Enron. For instance, Arthur Andersen
professional Standards Group partner Carl Bass sent an e-mail on
12/19/99 to Defendants Steward and Neuhausen expressing opposition
to Enron’s accounting for (a special purpose entity (SPE) funded with
Enron equity called “LJM2” with whom Enron had a contractual
relationship) and urged Arthur Andersen not to support it. Again on
15

John Coffee, Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1411-12
(2002).

16

Id. at 1412.

17

Macey & Sale, supra note 3, at 1180.
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2/4/00 Bass sent another e-mail to Stewart stating that Bass thought that
a particular SPE had no real substance and that he was annoyed that
Enron would receive appreciation on the Enron stock that had been
contributed to that SPE. That information was also sent to (other
members of the Enron audit team). ... Bass had ... commented that “this
whole deal looks like there is no substance.” Later, on March 4, 2001,
just before Bass was removed as PSG advisor for the Enron audit team,
Bass sent Stewart another e-mail criticizing Enron’s accounting for the
Blockbuster and Raptor transactions, which aggregated, constituted at
least $150 million in improperly recognized income or avoided losses
at year-end 2000.18
II. Empirical Analysis of Accounting Restatements
The lens through which we attempt to observe evidence of differing accounting
firm performance is incidence of financial restatements. As the name implies,
restatements occur when it is discovered that a company has made errors in its quarterly
or annual financial reports, requiring that those reports be redone with the financial
results “restated.” In other words, restatements occur when an accounting firm errs
sufficiently in reporting the financial results of a client company to warrant restating the
results. Accounting restatements provide an opportunity to measure accounting firm
performance because they indicate the incidence of major accounting errors.
Empirical evidence suggests the importance of restatements in terms of both
frequency and financial impact. A well-known General Accounting Office (GAO)
study reported that a surprisingly large portion (10 percent) of publicly traded
companies restated their financial results due to financial irregularities from 19972001.19 Thus the problem appears to extend beyond the famous restatements that
companies such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Global Crossing have been
required to do.
Accounting restatements have, on average, a significant negative impact on
equity returns.20 An important study by Kinney and McDaniel of the characteristics of
18

In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 679 (S.D. Texas 2002).

19

General Accounting Office, Financial Statement Restatements, GAO-0-138 (July 2003).

20

W.R. Kinney, Jr. & L.S. McDaniel, Characteristics of Firms Correcting Previously Reported Quarterly
Earnings, 11 J. Accounting Econ., 71-93 (1989); M.L. DeFond and J. Jiambalvo, Incidence and
Circumstances of Accounting Errors, 66 Accounting Rev. 643-655 (1991); E.H. Feroz, K. Park, and V.S.
Pastena, The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases,
29 J. Accounting Research (Supp.) 107-142 (1991); P.M. Dechow, P.R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney, Causes
and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms’ Subject to Enforcement Actions by
the SEC, 13 Contemporary Accounting Research, 1-36 (1996); M.D. Beneish, Detecting GAAP
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restating firms found not only significant negative share price reactions, but also
negative abnormal returns between the issuance of the erroneous quarterly reports and
the corrections of those reports.21 Richardson et al. found that firms that restate
experience declines in share prices of 25 percent on average.22 The GAO study,
consistent with academics’ analyses, found that restatements cost investors 10 percent
of the equity value of their shares, from the day before to the day after the restatement.
Measuring the 120 day period beginning 60 days before the restatement to 60 days after
the restatement, the GAO found that restatement cost investors 18 percent of their stock
value. Firms issuing restatements also tend to be less profitable, slower growing, more
heavily leveraged and have received more qualified audit opinions.23
Moreover, it appears that many financial restatements mask precisely the
information that investors value the most: information about downturns in economic
performance. Callen, Livnat, and Segal found, for example, that companies that restated
their performance due to accounting errors “exhibited poorer financial performance
during the period affected by the restatement relative to the prior period.”24
Of course, restatements are not the only indicia of auditing errors or of the
possibility of auditor capture. Another way that auditors can be lax is by allowing
clients to treat accounting errors that should trigger restatements as prospective changes
of estimates of future performance, and allowing the changes in accounting treatment
to flow through current and future periods in order to avoid attracting attention. Other
indicia of auditor quality are the rate at which auditors issue qualifications of their
opinions, and the rate at which firms switch auditors. None of these other approaches
to the issue we address lends itself to the empirical approach we take in this paper
because these other indicia require much more subjective judgments about the
motivation for the changes being made.

Violations: Implications for Assessing Earnings Management Among Firms with Extreme Financial
Performance, 16 J. Accounting and Public Policy, 271-309; Z. Palmrose, V.J. Richardson, and S. Scholtz,
Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements, 2001 Univ. of Kansas Working Paper;
L. Turner, J.R. Dietrich, and A.D. Bailey, Accounting Restatements, 2001 Univ. of Illinois Working
Paper.
21

Kinney & McDaniel, supra note 20.

22

S. Richardson, I. Tuna, and M. Wu, Predicting Earnings Management: The Case of Earnings
Restatements, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Working Paper.

23

Kinney & McDaniel, supra note 20, at 71-93.

24

Jeffrey Callen, Joshua Livnat, and Dan Segal, Accounting Restatements: Are They Always Bad News?,
May, 2002 draft at 1 (accessed at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/accounting/papers/a2002-07.pdf, Aug.
8, 2003).
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While restatements are, on average, clearly bad for investors, the precise
economic costs of restatements is difficult to quantify because of the inchoate nature of
certain of the costs associated with the restatement process. Accounting restatements
lead to a reduction in trust in the accounting results reported by public companies. As
trust in financial reporting declines, investors are likely to flee the capital markets,
making capital formation more difficult and leading, ultimately, to higher capital costs,
slower growth, and higher unemployment.
A. The Data
We use two data sets to study financial restatement rates.
First, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified firms that restated their
financial results from 1997 to 2001. The GAO data are especially appropriate because
they discriminate by the nature of the financial restatement. Not all restatements are the
same. While accounting literature traditionally treats all restatements as potentially bad
signals for investors and other financial statement users, more recent studies show that,
under certain circumstances, some restatements are less problematic than others. A
2002 study by Callen, Livnat, and Segal found that about 15 percent of restatements due
to accounting errors, and about 40 percent of restatements due to changes in accounting
principles, actually increase the income of the firm’s that are making the restatements.25
Consistent with these observations about restatements, the GAO restatements
database we use excludes restatement announcements that resulted from normal
corporate activity or simple presentation issues. The data base excludes financial
statement restatements resulting from mergers and acquisitions, discontinued
operations, stock splits, issuance of stock dividends, currency-related issues, changes
in business segment definitions, changes due to transfers of management, changes made
for presentation purposes, litigation settlements, and arithmetic and general
bookkeeping errors. Also excluded from the GAO sample are general accounting
changes made under generally accepted accounting principles, and changes resulting
from accounting policy changes. Thus, only restatements made to correct a previous
misstatement of financial reports are in the GAO data.26
Second, to identify the universe of possible restatements of large firms, we rely
on published data from annual editions of Who Audits America.27 These data are needed
25

Callen et al., supra note 24.

26

GAO-03-138, supra note 19, at 76.

27

Who Audits America (40th through 44th eds. Data Financial Press 1997-2001). This is the same data
source used by the GAO in its study of concentration in the accounting industry. General Accounting
Office, Public Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition, GAO–3-864, at
111 (July 2003). GAO reports that it tested the reliability of this database’s auditor information against
other sources and found it reliable. Id. at 111 n.2.

11

because the GAO data reveal which firms restate but do not reveal which firms do not
restate. The Who Audits America annual reports contain information about each
publicly traded firm, including sales, location of headquarters, Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) code based on the 1987 U.S. SIC classification, and, most
importantly, which accounting firm audited each firm. Our focus is on large firms, so
we limit the sample to firms with $1 billion or more in sales as measured in 2001
dollars.
B. Hypotheses to Be Tested
Using the GAO and other data, empirical analysis of financial restatements may
shed light on the issues of Andersen’s performance relative to other firms and of auditor
independence and governance.
First, if Andersen systematically delivered lower quality audits, one would
expect the rate of financial restatements to be higher among Andersen’s clients.
Whether revealed by SEC scrutiny or market forces, inaccurate financial statements are
difficult to cover up forever. Either a company improves earnings sufficiently to cover
the inaccuracy or the inaccuracy eventually is reflected in earnings discontinuity or
outright scandal.
Second, Part I’s discussion of audit firm capture suggests that large companies
will be better able to capture their accounting firms than smaller companies. Other
things being equal, the existence of a financial restatement should be associated with
increasing firm size. Kinney and McDaniel find that firms that are forced to correct
their financial results typically are smaller than other firms in their respective
industries.28 In addition, accounting research reveals that attempts by company
management to make accounting adjustments that create the appearance of improved
corporate performance tend to be more successful for larger firms than for smaller
firms. Both Nelson et al. and Wright and Wright have found that auditors are more
likely to succumb to managers’ attempts to manage earnings for large clients than for
small clients.29
But the GAO found that, while 10 percent of all listed companies announced at
least one restatement during the 1997-2002 period, the proportion of large companies
restating their financial results was significantly smaller, ranging from 0.89 percent in

28

Kinney & McDaniel, supra note 20.

29

Mark W. Nelson, John A. Elliott, and Robin Tarpley, Evidence from Auditors About Managers’ and
Auditors’ Earnings Management Decisions, 77 The Accounting Rev. 175-202 (2002); A. Wright & S.
Wright, An Examination of Factors Affecting the Decision to Waive Audit Adjustments, 12 J.
Accounting, Auditing and Finance 15-36 (1997).
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1997 to 2.5 percent in 2001.30 The decreasing rate of restatements as firms increase in
size may constitute evidence undermining the capture hypothesis. Alternatively, the
firms in the full GAO sample, while large, may be, on average, still too small to capture
auditors. Further exploring the relation between firm size and restatement rates among
large firms should provide support for one explanation or the other. In other words, it
may be the case that firms have to reach a very significant size level before capture
becomes likely. Since our data include a plausible measure of firm size, sales, this
hypothesis can be tested.
C. Empirical Results
1. Restatement Rates by Audit Firms
We first examine factors that might influence restatement rates in isolation and
them combine the influence of these factors in regression models.
Table 1 reports the basic relation between accounting firms and restatement
rates. For each major auditing firm, the first row of numbers is the proportion of largefirm clients that had financial restatements. For example, Table 1’s first row shows,
under the 1997 column, that no large firms audited by Andersen in 1997 have,
according to the GAO, restated their results. The same row, under the table’s 2001
column, shows that 3.1 percent of Andersen’s 2001 larger clients issued financial
restatements. The numbers in the rows appearing under the restatement rates indicate
the total number of firms in the sample audited in the year. For example, the 1997
column indicates that the zero restatements for Andersen clients in that year were out
of 202 clients. The 3.1 percent Andersen restatement rate for 2001 is based on a total
Andersen client sample for 2001 of 224. The number of restatements would thus be
.031 times 224, or seven restatements.

30

GAO, supra note 19.
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Table 1. Audit Firm Restatement Rates for Large Clients, by Year, 1997-2001
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total
0.000
0.010
0.021
0.014
0.031
0.016
202
199
285
212
224
1122
Coopers
0.008
0.008
132
132
Deloitte
0.000
0.007
0.026
0.006
0.049
0.018
165
152
233
167
164
881
Ernst
0.019
0.019
0.027
0.005
0.034
0.021
215
215
291
218
233
1172
KPMG
0.000
0.007
0.024
0.034
0.034
0.020
147
144
208
146
149
794
PWC
0.000
0.015
0.013
0.037
0.048
0.024
145
270
371
272
269
1327
Total
0.005
0.012
0.022
0.020
0.039
0.020
1006
980
1388
1015
1039
5428
Note. First row for each firm is the number of restatements divided by the
number of audits. Second row for each firm is the number of audits. Sources: GAO;
annual editions of Who Audits America.
Audit firm
Andersen

Table 1’s “Total” column reports the cumulative five-year restatement rates and
client counts for each firm. Of the five major accounting firms that span our five-year
sample period (Coopers merged into PWC and thus appears in only one column),
Andersen had the lowest rate of restatements, 1.6 percent. The year-by-year analysis
contained in the table’s individual columns indicate that this low rate over our five-year
sample period is not an artifact of one peculiar year. In no year was Andersen the leader
in restatement rates for large firms. In fact, no firm differed statistically significantly
from other firms in restatement rates. Andersen’s low rate could be a consequence of
random fluctuation, but no evidence supports it having a higher restatement rate than
other accounting firms.
The small number of restatements raises the question whether the data have
sufficient power to detect an Andersen effect, even if one exists. A power computation
helps assess this issue. The non-Andersen restatement rates is 90 restatements out of
5306 audits or 0.017. Suppose one designated a restatement rate of twice the industry
standard to be socially meaningful. Under this view, an Andersen restatement rate of
0.034 would be socially important. Given our sample size, the probability of detecting
a difference in restatement rates this large or larger, at a 0.05 level of statistical
significance, is 0.89, close to 90 percent. If, instead one regarded a restatement rate of
1.5 the industry average as important, the probability of detecting such a difference, at
the 0.05 level, in our sample is 39 percent. So the persuasiveness of our finding of no
statistically significant difference between Andersen and other firms depends on how
14

large a difference one would regard as socially important. Putting aside the power
calculation, the inability to detect a significant effect in five full years of large-firm data
suggests that the effect requires many years of data to emerge. This is in contrast to
other factors we analyze, notably firm size and the trend of increasing restatements over
time, that do emerge in the same size sample. So the absence of an Andersen effect is
likely not merely a consequence of sample size.
But other factors should be considered. Even within this set of restatements, as
filtered by the GAO, not all restatements are the same. Restatements due to errors in
“revenue recognition” (recording revenues) is the largest category of restatements due
to accounting errors. And it has the largest negative effect on firms, accounting for an
average decline in ROA (return on assets) of 8 percent.31 To further examine the
restatement pattern across accounting firms, we isolate those firms that were forced to
restate their financial results due to earnings restatements. For each firm, we divided
the number of revenue recognition restatements by the number of restatements. Table
2 reports the results.
Table 2. Rates of Revenue-Recognition Restatements by Auditing Firm
Audit firm

Proportion of restatements
involving revenue recognition
Andersen
0.278
Coopers
0.000
Deloitte
0.563
Ernst
0.360
KPMG
0.250
PWC
0.344
Total
0.352
Sources: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.

Number of
restatements
18
1
16
25
16
32
108

The table reveals no statistically significant pattern of revenue recognition
restatements (p=0.469) across accounting firms. Andersen’s rate is not the lowest, but
it is far from the highest. Aside from Coopers, which has only one year of data,
Andersen had the second lowest rate of revenue recognition restatements.
Clients and auditors may differ in their willingness to acknowledge previous
accounting errors by issuing financial restatements. For example, as noted above, an
auditor can be lax by allowing clients to treat corrections that should cause restatements
as prospective changes of estimates, which flow through current and future periods, and
avoid attracting attention. Thus, the fact that accounting firms have similar restatement
rates may not reflect actual audit quality or auditor independence because some auditors
may be more reluctant to issue restatements or may have a pool of clients that are more
reluctant. To the extent that an accounting firm values its reputation, the firm may be
31

Callen, Livnat, and Segal, supra note 24, at 3.
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reluctant to require that an audit client restate its financial results, since such a
requirement will reflect poorly on the audit firm’s original work. Thus accounting firms
may have an incentive to refrain from revealing their previous errors in the hopes that
such errors will remain undetected.
This sort of unrevealed behavior is obviously difficult to detect but two tests of
this hypothesis can be conducted with available information. First, the GAO data
provide one useful approach. The GAO report includes an analysis of the identity of
the source that initially prompted the restatement. SEC-prompted restatements may be
of special concern because neither the company nor its auditor has been forthcoming.
Auditor-prompted restatements may be of interest because they represent tension
between auditors and management.32 Another way in which auditor reluctance to issue
restatements might emerge is through observing the restatement pattern in the year after
audit clients switch auditors. If Andersen were an outlier, one might expect to see a
higher rate of restatements by its former clients in the year following a change of
auditors. To study these, we identified each instance of auditor-change and recorded
whether a restatement occurred in the year following change. Table 3 summarizes the
results of both inquiries.

32

We would expect auditor prompted restatements to be extremely rare because it is our understanding
that, as a matter of industry practice, auditors typically report auditing mistakes to their clients and give
the clients the opportunity to report the restatement. Thus we do not find it surprising that only
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Table 3. Audit Firm Propensity to Suppress Need Restatments
A. Entity Prompting Financial Restatement
Unknown
SEC

Auditor

Company or
company/FASB
3
0
5
9
4
12
33

Total
restatements
18
1
16
25
16
32
108

Andersen
10
5
0
Coopers
1
0
0
Deloitte
8
3
0
Ernst
8
7
1
KPMG
6
6
0
PWC
14
5
1
Total
47
26
2
B. Restatements in Year After Auditor Changes
Old auditor
No
Restatement
Percent
Total audits
restatement
restatements
Andersen
12
1
7.7
13
Deloitte
6
1
14.3
7
Ernst
12
0
0.0
12
KPMG
16
2
11.1
18
PWC
26
0
0.0
26
Total-year
72
4
5.3
76
following change
No change
4998
100
2.0
5098
Total
5070
104
2.0
5174
Note. Each cell in panel A is the number of restatements prompted by the entity represented in
the column. Panel B’s firm-specific rows are the number of audits with and without restatements in the
year following a change of auditors Panel B excludes Coopers because all of its clients had to change
auditors following its combination with what is now PWC. Sources: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits
America.

Table 3, panel A, reports the entity prompting restatement for each of the 108
restatements in our data. It shows, as best the GAO can detect, that no auditing firm
is a fertile source of restatement initiatives. Only two of 108 restatements were
prompted by the auditor and no auditor prompted more than one restatement. The many
unknown prompters, 47 of 108 (44 percent), suggests hesitation in reaching firm
conclusions. Nevertheless, the GAO data provide little evidence that Andersen is
unusual. The SEC prompted restatements in five of the 18 (28 percent) Andersen-client
restatements. KPMG’s 6 of 16 (38 percent) rate was higher and the rate of SECprompted statements did not differ significantly across accounting firms (p=0.583).
Of those restatements with known causes, Andersen’s five of eight restatements
was high, but not statistically significantly different from even the lowest rate, PWC’s
five of eighteen (p=0.189). And if one looks at SEC-prompted restatements as a
proportion of all audits (Table 1 reports the number of audits by each firm), rather than
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of all restatements, the differences restatement rates by source of restatement become
vanishing small.
Panel B reports the restatement rates for the year following a change of auditor.
We exclude Coopers because its absorption by PWC meant that all of its client had to
change auditors. The restatement rate across all other firms, in the year following an
audit change is about 5.3 percent. This rate is 2.7 times the restatement rate in years in
which there was no auditor change, shown in panel B’s penultimate row (p=0.066). So
auditor change years seem to lead to a higher rate of restatements. But there again is
little evidence of an Andersen effect. The rate of audits for previous Andersen client
in years following auditor change is 7.7 percent. Deloitte and KPMG have higher rates;
Ernst and PWC have lower rates. The small number of auditor changes makes one
hesitate to conclude too much, but yet another piece of evidence fails to support
Andersen as a performance outlier.
2. Other Influences on Restatement Rates

.01

Proportion restatements
.015
.02
.025

.03

Size. As audit clients increase in size, the risk of audit-firm capture should
increase. As suggested above, the person who heads the audit team of a large client
likely finds his or her career path increasingly tied to pleasing that client as the client
increases in size. This suggests that we should expect an increasing rate of restatements
as firm size increases.
Figure 1 shows
Restatement Rate by Audit Client Size
precisely this effect..
(size measured by sales)
The restatement rate
for audit clients with
sales in excess of
about $ 14 billion is
more than twice the
restatement rate for
audit clients with sales
of about $ 1 billion.
The existence
of the size effect
raises the question
whether the effect
1-1.4
>1.4-2.0
>2.0-3.4
>3.4-7.5
>7.5-14.2
>14.2
Audit client sales (billions $ 2001)
varies by audit firm.
Would a figure such
as Figure 1 vary if it
were broken down by the major auditing firms? Appendix Figure 1 shows the relation
between restatement rates and client size for individual audit firm figures. It suggests
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that the relation between client size and restatements is strongest for Deloitte and PWC,
and not strong at all for Andersen.33
Regional Effects. Accounting-firm capture might manifest itself in the form of
regional or local office effects. Treating each firm as a single entity does not reflect the
reality of how dispersed their offices are. Although Andersen generally may have been
no different than the other big accounting firms, perhaps Andersen’s offices in
particular parts of the country were more susceptible to capture.
The small number of large-client restatements, 108 over a five-year period.,
limits the ability to detect effects at the local office level. Table 4 reports the
restatement rates for each audit firm for each region. For example, it shows that
Andersen’s New England offices restated 1.4 percent of audits. Andersen offices in the
West restated 2.7 percent of audits.
Table 4. Financial Restatement Rates by Audit Firm and Region
Audit firm
Region
New England
Mid-atlantic
South
(confederacy)
Midwest
Plains
Pacific/south-west
South (nonconfed)
West
Total

Andersen
0.014
71
0.012
168
0.025
324
0.009
321
0.034
29
0.017
118
0.000
50
0.027
37
0.016
1,118

Coopers
0.000
19
0.000
37
0.000
28
0.000
25
0.000
2
0.091
11
0.000
3
0.000
6
0.008
131

Deloitte
0.000
44
0.017
178
0.020
204
0.015
204
0.045
22
0.021
193
0.042
24
0.000
11
0.018
880

Ernst
0.024
84
0.017
238
0.013
309
0.031
326
0.100
20
0.022
138
0.000
35
0.000
19
0.021
1,169

KPMG
0.047
86
0.012
169
0.016
193
0.014
139
0.111
18
0.017
120
0.000
44
0.125
8
0.021
777

PWC
0.035
113
0.034
353
0.028
211
0.031
228
0.250
4
0.014
143
0.000
75
0.000
43
0.027
1,170

Total
0.026
417
0.020
1.143
0.020
1,269
0.020
1,243
0.074
95
0.019
723
0.004
231
0.016
124
0.021
5,245

Andersen does show some inter-office variation. The restatement rate in the
Plains states is higher than in other regions. But two factors suggest that this is not
evidence of an “Andersen” effect. First, the Plains states restatement rates were highest
for all the remaining Big 4 firms. And the difference between the Plains states
33

We have also analyzed the relation between restatement rates and a clients’ share of sales of all of an
audit firm’s clients sales. The results do not materially differ from those reported in Appendix Figure 1.
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restatement rate and that for other regions is smaller for Andersen than for the other
firms. Second, the Plains region has by far the smallest number of audits, 95 out of
5,245 and the data become too thin to support positive conclusions. For example,
Andersen’s 3.4 percent Plains region restatement rate is one restatement out of 29. A
test of whether one can reject the hypothesis that Andersen’s restatement rates were
equal across regions yields a p-value of 0.58, using Fisher’s exact test, suggesting that
the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Only KPMG’s intrafirm variation across regions is
statistically significant, with p = 0.04.
Table 4's last column ignores individual accounting firm variation but reveals
a possible overall regional effect. The Plains states had by far the highest rate of
restaements, 7.4 percent compared to a national average of 2.1 percent. Although this
regional variation does not appear to be particularly revealing of something special
about Andersen, it does suggest that a complete analysis of restatement rates should
account for regional effects.
Industry effects. Certain industries may be more difficult to audit than others,
because the nature of their business is more complex. Alternatively, it may be that the
participants in some industries are more unscrupulous than others, or that they are
subject to more intense competitive pressures that induce them either to cheat more or
to take more aggressive accounting positions in order to impress customers, suppliers
or participants in the capital markets that extend credit to the company. These factors
suggest that one ought to control for possible industry effects before concluding that
audit firms do or do not differ in restatement rates.
The distribution of clients among large audit firms highlights the need to account
for industry effects. The degree of client-industry concentration within the accounting
profession has become acutely worse since Andersen disappeared. Table 5 reports the
GAO’s findings on the percentage of assets audited by particular accounting firms in
selected industries.34 For example, among general building contractors, two firms
(Andersen and Ernst & Young) audited 64.5 percent of the industry assets in 1997,
while two firms (Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche) audited 80.1 percent of the
industry in 2002. Similarly, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers and Andersen audited 61.7
percent of the assets in the petroleum and coal products business in 1997, while
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers audited 76.4 percent of this industry in 2002. Since audit
firms’ client concentrations vary by industry, it is useful to control for clients’ industries
in assessing audit firm effects.

34

The data in these tables are from GAO Mandated Report, supra note 27, at 27-30 & Appendix I.
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Table 5. Percentage of Assets of Selected Industries Audited
by Particular Accounting Firms 1997, 2002
Andersen Coopers

Deloitte

1997
1997
1997
General building contractors
31.6
17.7 13.3
Petroleum and coal products
33.2
11.1
1.0
Air transportation
39.9
0.0
1.4
Nondepository institutions
8.9
0.9
8.3
Metal mining
31.0
16.8
0.4
General building contractors
31.6
17.7 13.3
Chemical and allied products
20.6
16.0 21.0
Industry machinery and equipment
5.7
4.6
5.4
Transportation by air
39.9
0.0
1.4
Business services
8.8
51.6 12.8
Oil and gas extraction
15.9
13.8
5.1
Furniture and fixtures
49.1
1.5
9.4
Petroleum and coal products
33.2
11.1
1.0
Transportation and equipment
1.4
38.4 46.3
Electric, gas, and sanitary services
35.8
17.7 28.0
Security and commodity brokers
0.0
20.9 30.3
Health Services
10.2
9.2
5.3
Depository institutions
6.6
6.5
8.3
Lumber and wood products
82.5
2.7
9.0
Printing and publishing
32.5
9.0 13.5
Water transportation
34.7
1.9 10.6
Holding, other investment comps.
35.4
3.7
4.5
Primary metals
9.2
28.2
5.4
Paper and allied products
35.5
11.8 15.0
Trucking and warehousing
46.7
4.3
4.5
Communications
24.6
30.8
6.1
Hotels and other lodging
88.6
0.3
1.7
Fabricated metal products
16.4
14.6
4.3
Source. GAO Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition.

2002
19.4
3.2
37.4
28.4
0.6
19.4
25.1
6.3
37.4
11.2
5.3
11.1
3.1
44.0
62.2
56.8
5.0
11.2
8.7
21.5
9.8
26.8
11.7
44.2
29.5
61.0
29.7
12.9

Ernst & Young
1997
32.9
21.9
37.5
3.6
9.1
32.9
14.6
5.7
37.5
15.4
17.2
7.5
21.9
6.9
2.9
46.8
45.0
21.6
0.5
21.7
16.7
14.6
25.7
13.4
27.1
18.8
2.4
12.4

2002
60.7
18.2
48.7
3.8
40.6
60.7
14.1
11.4
48.7
6.3
12.1
13.2
18.2
8.8
5.8
37.3
44.1
15.8
42.5
25.1
20.1
26.8
26.8
24.3
16.2
5.7
41.7
25.2

KPMG
1997
3.3
4.3
20.8
72.8
3.9
3.3
11.7
45.5
20.8
6.3
2.6
7.0
4.3
1.1
3.3
1.3
24.2
31.6
0.7
7.5
11.6
31.0
0.3
9.0
15.3
5.9
6.0
23.4

2002
3.3
2.2
13.4
59.5
6.4
3.3
10.6
51.9
13.4
8.7
18.3
6.1
2.2
1.6
7.3
3.0
29.8
35.6
29.1
13.9
9.9
19.4
1.2
12.8
49.6
7.2
12.8
24.5

PWC
1997
0.6
28.5
0.3
2.8
37.6
0.6
15.0
32.6
0.3
4.3
45.1
22.2
28.5
5.9
11.9
0.6
4.4
19.7
3.8
14.0
34.7
3.8
30.8
14.5
1.5
13.5
0.0
27.1

The GAO used the industry categories reported in Table 5 to illustrate industry
concentration. But the 28 industries in Table 5 account for only about half the
observations in our data. In addition, the GAO industry categories yield eight categories
with no restatements. This lack of variation precludes including such industry
categories in the regression models below. To avoid these exclusions and to include our
the sample, we use the Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) used by the GAO35 but
regroup the classifications into 17 reasonably-sized categories, each with some number
of restatements. Table 6 reports the restatement results by our industry groupings.

35

The GAO used the SIC codes reported in Who Audits America. GAO Mandated Report, supra note 27,
at 111.
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2002
15.0
76.4
0.4
3.8
50.1
15.0
48.7
29.5
0.4
60.8
63.4
68.4
76.4
45.4
24.2
2.7
18.5
35.2
18.4
37.5
60.1
15.4
59.3
18.6
1.9
23.8
14.4
36.0

Table 6. Restatement Rates by Industry
Restatements
SIC-based groups
Number
Mineral industries
145
Construction industries
74
Manufacturing
589
Transportation and utilities
591
Communications
150
Wholesale trade
262
Retail trade
482
Finance, insurance, and real estate
752
Services
462
Instruments and related products
109
Food and kindred products
172
Paper and allied products
107
Chemicals and allied products
228
Industrial machinery and equipment
308
Electrical and electronic equipment
212
Transportation equipment
160
No SIC listed or SIC missing
517
Total
5320
Pearson chi2(16) = 31.1675 Pr = 0.013

Percent
99.3
97.4
98.2
98.7
98.7
97.0
97.6
99.2
98.3
94.8
96.6
97.3
97.9
96.9
95.9
96.4
99.0
98.0

Non-restatements
Number
1
2
11
8
2
.8
12
6
8
6
6
3
5
10
9
6
5
108

Percent
0.7
2.6
1.8
1.3
1.3
3.0
2.4
0.8
1.7
5.2
3.4
2.7
2.2
3.1
4.1
3.6
1.0
2.0

Total audits
146
76
600
599
152
270
494
758
470
115
178
110
233
318
221
166
522
5428

Industry restatement rates vary from 5.2 percent in “Investments and related
products” to 0.8 percent in “Finance, insurance, and real estate.” One can reject the
hypothesis that the industry groups have the same restatement rate at the 0.013 level.
It thus is appropriate to control for industry effects in assessing audit firm restatement
rates.
Time trend. Figure 2 shows by year the proportion of financial statements that
were restated. It shows an obvious upward trend. Restatement rates by large firms rose
from less than one percent in 1997 to nearly four percent in 2001. The number of
restatements increased eight-fold, from five in 1997 to 41 in 2001. These findings are
consistent with studies showing that the number of restatements generally has been on
the rise for several years.36
The increase in restatements is important for a number of reasons. First, from
the perspective of this paper, an increase in the number of restatements provides an
opportunity for accounting firms to distinguish themselves on the basis of quality if they
so choose. This is because if the general level of errors in financial reporting is rising,
then an individual accounting firm can differentiate its product simply by keeping its
own rate of accounting errors constant. The marked increase in restatements shown in
Figure 2 indicates that an accounting firm could develop a reputation for providing
36

http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,7472%7C%7CA%7C93%7C100,00.html
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higher quality audit services than its rivals simply by holding constant the level at which
its clients restate their earnings. Such a strategy would generate product differentiation
as rivals’ clients report increasingly high levels of accounting problems. But this has
not been the case. All of the large accounting firms’ clients continue to restate their
financial results at
similar rates, even as the
Financial Statement Restatement Rate by Year
overall level of
Large Public Corporations, 1997-2001
restatements continued
to increase between
1997 and 2001.
Simil a r l y , t he
time trend data is of
interest because it
suggests that, whatever
the source of the errors
in accounting that lead
to restatements, the
problem appears to be
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Audit Year
getting worse, not better.
Sources: GAO Report; Who Audits America, 1997-2001
The restatement problem
precedes the Enron
debacle and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, and has continued after these events,
suggesting that the pathologies within the accounting profession and within corporate
management are not easily resolved by political salience or legislative action.
The time trend likely reflects, among other factors, the efforts by the SEC, which
began in late 1998 and 1999 to focus energy and resources on earnings management and
aggressive accounting.37 We find it interesting that this increased focus did not result
in any differences in accounting irregularities among the clients of any single large
accounting firm. All of the big accounting firms appear to have responded the same
way not only to pressure from management, but also to the SEC’s enhanced
enforcement agenda.
37

The beginning of the SEC’s focus on accounting issues can be traced to a speech made on Sept. 28,
1998 by then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt at the NYU Center for Law and Business, which is said to have
“launched the SEC's attack on the practice of "earnings management" by public companies.”
h t t p : / / w w w . b a s s b e r r y . c o m/ r e s o u r c e s / c o r p / 0 6 1 1 9 9 / 2 . h t ml ; see also CNNMone y
http://money.cnn.com/1999/07/28/fortune/fortune_earnings/, reporting on “SEC crackdown on managed
earnings,” and http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/sep2000/grant.htm (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants website, quoting Arthur Levitt as saying, on Sept. 28, 1998, “We will formally target reviews
of public companies... that appear to manage earnings. Likewise our enforcement team will continue to
root out and aggressively act on abuses of the financial reporting process.” (cites accessed October 15,
2003).
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3. Regression Models
Taken in isolation, we find no audit-firm effect on restatement effects, a
significant Plains-states regional effect, suggestive industry effects, and a highly
suggestive time trend. To more fully explore audit-firm effects, we consider them
simultaneously with the other factors in regression models. Because the dependent
variable in our models is dichotomous--each firm in each year did or did not restate
financial results--logistic regression is an appropriate model. Since we have multiple
observations of most client firms (each client firm reports financial results each year),
it is appropriate to control for the non-independence of the client observations across
years. We use survey methodology that adjusts the standard errors of the regression
coefficients to account for this non-independence. Table 7 reports the results.38

38

An alternate set of models using panel data techniques with the client firms as the panel, the year-ofaudit time, and dummy variables for audit firms also yield no significant audit-firm effects. Maximum
likelihood complementary log-log regression models similarly yield results like those in Table 7.
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Table 7. Logistic Regression Models of Restatements
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable = restatement (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Andersen (reference category)
Coopers
Deloitte
Ernst
KPMG
PWC

-0.759
(0.74)
0.126
(0.36)
0.290
(0.95)
0.232
(0.65)
0.416
(1.41)

Sales (log)

-0.787
(0.76)
0.078
(0.23)
0.277
(0.90)
0.229
(0.64)
0.365
(1.26)
0.207*
(2.27)

Year 1997 (reference category)
Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001

0.695
(0.62)
0.091
(0.26)
0.291
(0.94)
0.250
(0.69)
0.323
(1.10)
0.204*
(2.27)

0.626
(0.55)
-0.011
(0.03)
0.155
(0.49)
0.161
(0.45)
0.291
(0.98)
0.183+
(1.91)

0.966+
(1.67)
1.563**
(2.92)
1.456**
(2.66)
2.169**
(4.22)

0.974+
(1.67)
1.619**
(3.00)
1.466**
(2.66)
2.194**
(4.22)

-7.251**
(7.74)
5428

-0.083
(0.22)
-0.046
(0.12)
-1.688
(1.59)
-0.165
(0.43)
1.463**
(3.18)
-0.279
(0.36)
-0.231
(0.54)
Not reported
-6.543**
(5.99)
5428

New England (reference category)
Mid-atlantic
South confederacy
South non-confederacy
Midwest
Plains
West
Pacific/Southwest
Industries by SIC Code
Constant

-4.116**
(17.86)
5428

Observations
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

-5.793**
(7.23)
5428

Table 7 indicates that the absence of evidence of any audit firm effects survives
controlling for industry, firm size, region, and year. The effects reported in the
univariate results persist. There are strong, significant time effects and a Plains-states
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effect. The industry variables, not reported in the table, are collectively significant, but
this result is sensitive to how industries are allocated among the major groupings. The
noteworthy result is that our finding of no evidence of differences in restatement rates
across accounting firms persist after controlling, as best we can, for the fact that
accounting firms appear to specialize along industry-specific lines, for regional effects,
for client size, and for time effects.
III. Implications of Results
The restatement results have implications on two levels. First, of course, they
directly show whether Andersen’s audits yielded financial restatement rates materially
different from those of other firms. Second, the results, as proxies for accounting firm
performance can help assess the state of client capture and corporate governance in the
studied firms.
A. Is Andersen an Outlier?
As noted earlier, some policy choices reflect the belief that Andersen was a
special case of bad behavior within the accounting industry. Others appear to reflect the
belief that accounting industry problems are endemic, that Andersen was not unusual.
Both sets of underlying assumptions could be true. The accounting industry might need
reform and, within the industry, Andersen may have been an especially suspect
participant. Under this view, a policy analysis of whether to single out Andersen for
termination through criminal prosecution would include considering factors in addition
to those customarily informing the decision to criminally prosecute.
In general, the theory that Andersen was a “miscreant” and an outlier seems to
have been embraced by the Justice Department and by courts examining Andersen’s
behavior. This outlier view appears in an opinion in the civil class action securities
fraud law suit against Enron’s professional advisers, including Andersen as well as
Enron’s banks and law firms. The opinion in In re Enron Securities Litigation states
that Andersen “is a repeat offender with a history of failed audits, conflicts of interest
and document destruction in some of the most egregious cases of accounting fraud in
history.” Specifically mentioned are Andersen’s allegedly improper conduct in Waste
Management, Sunbeam Corporation, Baptist Foundation of Arizona, Colonial Realty
Company, Lincoln Savings/ACC.” Andersen, it seems, deserved to fail since the firm
was alleged to have had a “callous, reckless disregard for its duty to investors and the
public trust for decades.”39 The Justice Department’s decision to bring criminal charges
against Andersen and none of the other major accounting firms supports the view that
39

See In re ENRON Corporation Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 2002 WL 31854963, at *
105 (S.D. Texas).
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Andersen deserved to be singled out for special treatment, though of course the decision
to bring any prosecution depends on other factors, including the strength of the case and
sometimes the public’s perceived demand for action.
The evidence presented here cannot of course directly counter the court’s
qualitative statements, which are consistent with the Justice Department’s behavior,
about Andersen’s behavior. The evidence does suggest that, by one objective measure
of accounting performance, Andersen was a mainstream firm.
Consistent with our results, on January 2, 2002, Deloitte and Touche published
the results of its audit quality peer review of Andersen. This peer review is considered
“one of the most intensive peer reviews in Andersen’s history,” covering 240 Andersen
audit engagements in 30 offices (the sample did not include Enron), and concluded that
“Andersen’s system of accounting and audit quality provided reasonable assurance of
compliance with professional standards.”40
In related research, Chaney and Philipich (2002) have examined whether Arthur
Andersen’s performance in its Enron engagement affected the share prices of
Andersen’s other clients.41 As with our research, Chaney and Philipich try to determine
whether auditor reputation matters, and the extent to which market forces are effective
at inducing managers to submit to high quality monitoring in order to reduce agency
costs.
Chaney and Philipich examine the market reaction to Enron-related events that
might have an impact on Andersen’s reputation for providing high quality audits. These
authors find that Andersen clients begin losing value, relative to companies audited by
other accounting firms, in January, 2001. Unlike our own research, Chaney and
Philipich’s research appears to assume that Andersen’s reputation was not different
from that of the other Big-5 accounting firms prior to the Enron debacle. Interestingly,
and consistent with our results, in their event studies, Chaney and Philipich do not find
any statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns for Andersen clients and nonAndersen clients as a result of Enron’s announcement on November 8, 2001 that it was
restating its financial results; nor do they find any negative abnormal returns when
Andersen was subpoenaed by Congress to turn over documents related to Enron. There
also was no finding that Andersen’s clients performed worse than the clients of other
audit firms around December 12, 2001, when Andersen’s CEO, Joseph Bernardino
testified before Congress that Andersen’s Enron audit engagement team had made errors
in judgment in connection with its auditing work for Enron.42
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Paul R. Chaney & Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure, 9 J. Accounting
Res. 1221, 1223 (2002).

41

Id.

42

Id.
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Interestingly, however, Chaney and Philipich do find statistically significant
negative results for Andersen’s clients surrounding the January 10, 2002 date when
Enron announced that it had shredded audit documents related to its work on the Enron
account. These results might be interpreted as evidence of a loss of reputation for
Andersen, relative to other firms. On the other hand, rather than signaling relative
quality, these results also could be interpreted as signaling that Enron was likely to be
indicted as a result of its document shredding and that the probability of the firm
surviving was low. It is also worth noting that document shredding does not reflect on
the firm’s overall ability to conduct audits.
Chaney and Philipich’s results might be interpreted more straight-forwardly as
signaling the market’s assessment of the probability of Andersen survival.43 The
prospect that Andersen would fail posed significant regulatory costs and uncertainty on
its existing clients. In addition to the direct costs of having to switch auditors if
Andersen should fail, public companies audited by Andersen faced the risk that they
would be unable to file in a timely fashion legally mandated reports with the SEC that
require the inclusion of audit-related services and opinion letters. Thus, even holding
auditor quality constant, the prospect that Andersen would cease to exist as a going
concern would be expected to have a significant negative effect on the share prices of
Andersen’s clients.
In addition, during the period studied by Chaney and Philipich, there also was
uncertainty about whether certain institutional investors would be able to invest in
companies audited by Andersen. This result appears to be confirmed by Rauterkus and
Song ‘s finding that the unsealing of the criminal indictment against Arthur Andersen
had a negative and significant impact on Andersen’s clients, while no other event
besides Enron’s bankruptcy filing had a statistically significant effect on Enron’s
clients.44
An important additional factor that should have influenced the decision to
effectively close Andersen is the accounting industry’s high concentration. The top four
firms account for more than 60 percent of the entire market. The Big 4 firms audit over
97 percent of public companies with sales over $250 million. They audit 99 percent of
public company total sales. The smallest Big 4 accounting firm had $3.2 billion in
revenue in 2002. The fifth largest firm, Grant Thornton, had only $400 million in
revenue, and the fifth largest firm, BDO Seidman had $353 million in revenue.45 After
43

See also, Paul K. Chaney and Kirk L Philipich, “The Price Earnings Relation in Troubled Times: The
Case of Arthur Andersen,” January 12, 2003 draft.
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Rauterkus, S.Y. and Song, K.R., The Effect of Auditor Reputation on Auditee Stock Performance: The
Case of Arthur Andersen, March 15, 2003 working paper.
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Id. at 16-21.
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Andersen’s demise, the Hirschman-Herfendahl (HHI) index for the accounting
profession increased to 2566, well above the threshold of 1800 that indicates a highly
concentrated market in which firms have the potential for market power.
The market for auditing the work of large companies is even more concentrated.
In 2002, the four-firm concentration ratio for public companies was 99 percent.46 In
1997, when Andersen was still in business, the concentration ratio was only 71 percent.
Thus, unless Andersen was truly an outlier, effectively terminating its existence was an
important public policy question that may not have been given full consideration. As
the GAO observed in its report, “it is unclear whether and to what extent the Antitrust
Division was consulted and to what extent the DOJs Antitrust Division had input into
the decision to criminally indict Andersen.”47
By contrast, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress’s legislative response to
the Enron-era, reflects the premise that significant structural problems in the accounting
industry required legislative attention. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public
Company Accounting Board (PCOB),48 which was given the authority to oversee
accounting firms that audit public companies. The Act requires accounting firms that
perform audits of public companies to register with the PCOB. The PCOB is
empowered to set standards for the reports generated in the course of public company
audits, to inspect public accounting firms, to conduct investigations, and to impose
sanctions on accounting industry professionals and accounting firms that fail to meet
PCOB standards.
Sarbanes-Oxley also provides sanctions for accounting firms that fail to
supervise their accountants, and establishes duties of care for audit firms and their
partners.49 To improve auditor independence, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the auditor
partners assigned to client accounts be rotated every five years50 and severely restricts
consulting and other non-audit services that audit firms can offer to their clients.51
These restrictions were designed to improve auditor independence by preventing the
46

The concentration ratio is the proportion of total output in an industry that's produced by a given number
of the largest firms in the industry. The two most common concentration ratios are for the four largest
firms and the eight largest firms. The four-firm concentration ratio, as such, is the proportion of total
output produced by the four largest firms in the industry and the eight-firm concentration ratio is
proportion of total output produced by the eight largest firms in the industry. The four-firm concentration
ratio is commonly used to indicate the degree to which an industry is oligopolistic. See
http://www.amosweb.com/cgi-bin/gls.pl?fcd=dsp&key=concentration+ratio.
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preparation of accounting statements by accounting firms from being used as a “loss
leader” for the purpose of selling more lucrative tax and consulting services.
Our empirical results are consistent with the premise, inherent in SarbanesOxley, that problems that exist in the accounting industry were not isolated in a single
firm, but rather are shared by all of the firms that audit public companies.
B. Client Capture and Corporate Governance
The evidence on accounting firm restatements does not indicate that the other
accounting firms have been captured to any greater or lesser degree than Andersen. It
does, however, suggest one notable relation between firm size and restatement
likelihood.
The positive, significant coefficient on firm size in Table 7, as measured by
sales, may be interpreted as evidence of capture. The coefficient indicates that larger
firms are more likely to restate their financial results than the smaller firms in our
sample. But recall that all the firms analyzed here are large in the sense that they have
sales of at least $1 billion. This result is consistent with the capture theory of accounting
firms. It is not consistent, however, with the GAO’s findings that smaller firms are
more likely to restate. The difference in result may be explained by the fact that we
analyze only large firms’ restatements, while the GAO examined all public firms that
issued restatements. While small firms are more likely to restate as a general matter,
among a sample of larger firms, the largest firms are more likely to restate. It could also
be that the ability of client corporations to use promises to give, or threats to withhold,
consulting work to achieve bargaining leverage over consulting firms has led to an
increase in audit firm capture by smaller firms. We think that it is more likely that
consulting firm revenue bears some relationship to the size of the company receiving
such services. If this is true, then large firms would have been more likely to capture
their auditors than smaller firms.
Research in accounting that has found a correlation between firm size and
management attempts to manage earnings has been explained on the basis that large
clients simply have more sophisticated accounting departments that are better at
financial engineering that presents financial results in ways that are consistent with
applicable accounting principles. However, since we are looking at restatements, which
reflect accounting errors, and not the results of generic disagreements between auditors
and their clients, our findings are not vulnerable to this explanation. Instead, the capture
hypothesis seems more consistent with our data set.52
C. Accounting Firm Reputations
52

See Nelson, Elliott & Tarpley, supra note 29; Wright & Wright, supra note 29.
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Our analysis also helps assess whether the large accounting firms differentiate
themselves on the basis of performance. Product differentiation is, in theory, important
to firms. Even firms that enjoy monopolistic or oligopolistic competitive environments
benefit by producing high quality products because they can charge more for such
products. Of course, not all firms seek to distinguish themselves from direct rivals and
close substitutes by offering superior quality products: some compete by offering low
quality products that cost less, and still other firms compete in less scrupulous ways.53
Writing about “Enron-style” scandals, for example, Karpoff and Lott argue that
the financial value of a law-abiding reputation is better than tougher government
regulation in preventing scandals.54 Karpoff and Lott believe that a firms’ desire to
protect their reputations makes it unnecessary for Congress to pass tougher accounting
regulations and reforms. Indeed, Karpoff and Lott find that increases in criminal
penalties for financial fraud may do more harm than good because they tend to squeeze
out reputation as a means for reducing the incidence of fraud. Their study presumes that
accounting firms can and will differentiate themselves by developing stronger
reputations for providing honest results to their clients.
The evidence regarding accounting firm restatement rates implies that, by this
measure, one cannot meaningfully distinguish among the largest (“Big Five” or “Final
Four”) accounting firms on the basis of the quality of their work. Major accounting
firms make an insignificantly different number of errors, as evidenced by restatements.
This, in turn, removes one important way in which accounting firms might have
distinguished themselves in terms of their reputations. Consistent with this intuition,
data from other studies yields no evidence that any of the Big 4 accounting firms is able
to charge a “quality premium” over other Big 4 firms for their services. An extensive
literature search also turned up no evidence that any Big 4 firms enjoys a higher
reputation among consumers than the others.
53

In highly regulated industries, demand for firms’ services may be created artificially. For example,
companies could once compete for investors by seeking the assistance of auditors and publicizing that
assistance. With enactment of the federal securities laws, companies were required to have auditors to
fulfill regulatory requirements. These sorts of regulations have the capacity to distort the competition that
occurs among auditors.
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Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing
Criminal Fraud, 36 J. L. & Econ., 757-802 (1993). A press release on the Univ. of Washington website
indicates that Karpoff and Lott have updated their results after Enron. This press release includes the
accounting industry as having incentives to develop reputations for performing high quality work,
“accounting firms will develop stronger reputations for providing honest results to their clients… [T]heir
reputations will cost more to clients, but some firms will find it worthwhile to pay more because they want
to convince investors that their books are not cooked.” See
http://www.washington.edu/newsroom/news/2002archive/02-02archive/k022802a.html, accessed Aug.
8, 2003.
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Although the Big 4 accounting firms may have the incentives to distinguish
themselves from their rivals that Karpoff and Lott identify, they do not appear to have
succeeded in achieving produce differentiation in one important area. It may be the case
that the costs associated with taking additional expenditures to further reduce the small
incidence of that we observe to a point at which distinctions among the largest
accounting firms would be possible are so massive that they are not worth the benefits.
A recent GAO study complements our findings regarding the reputations of the
Big 4 accounting firms. The study shows that factors such as expertise, global reach,
and reputation do not play a role in determining the market shares of accounting firms.
Rather, a simple model of pure price competition which does not take these factors into
consideration is able to simulate the actual market shares of the Big 4 accounting firms
that we observe.55 In this model, clients choose auditors using price, ignoring factors
such as quality or reputation, to assess whether the current high degree of concentration
in the market for audit services is necessarily inconsistent with a price-competitive
setting.56 These results are consistent with our findings that audit firms have not
succeeded in differentiating their products from those of their competitors. Rather, the
results produced by the computer-generated market model "mimicked a process of pure
price competition in which firms bid for each client, based on the short-term cost of
performing the audit."57 This result held on simulations in which firms competed for
clients from scratch, as well as in simulations in which companies were assigned to
their current auditors in order to determine if firms could defend their current market
shares based solely on price competition. The model also simulated a situation in which
the five largest firms below the Big 4 were combined in order to see if they could
compete successfully with the Big 4 for large clients. Interestingly, the model
predicted that the new firm that resulted from the merger of the fifth through the ninth
largest audit firms would not make significant inroads into the market share of the
current Big 4 audit firms.
While our findings are consistent with these results, they are not consistent with
the GAO’s 2003 survey of chairpersons of Fortune 500 companies’ audit committees.
Ninety-one percent of respondents found that the reputation of the audit firm was
important (58 percent of respondents found that the reputation of the audit firm was of
“very great importance” and 33 percent found that the audit firm’s reputation was of
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The GAO model is based on the methodology developed by Rajib Doogar & Robert Easley,
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25 J. Accounting and Econ. 235-253 (1998).
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“great importance.”).58 Interestingly, none of the survey respondents felt that the
reputation of the audit firm was of little or no importance: indeed only 9 percent
thought that auditor reputation was only moderately important.
Of course it may well be that accounting firms do not compete on the basis of
the measure of quality captured here, but along some other vector. A recent study of
stock options granted to top executives of 224 firms that announced financial
restatements due to accounting irregularities during the period January 1997 through
June 2002 found that firms that announced large negative restatements had granted
about 50 percent more stock options to their top executives in the years prior to the
restatement announcement.59 This study found that firms in the top 20 percent of option
grants have twice as many restatements as firms in the bottom 20 percent of firms by
option grants. The implication of this study is that private gains in the option portfolios
of top managers may have given them incentives to interpret GAAP aggressively.
These executives, in turn, could use their significant leverage over their firms’ choice
of accounting firms to select an auditor that will comply with management’s preference
for aggressive/illegal accounting. This would, in turn, lead accounting firms who are
unwilling to succumb to managers’ preferences for aggressive accounting treatment to
lose business to more aggressive rivals. However, our results do not indicate that this
“race-to-the-bottom” theory of competition and product differentiation in the accounting
industry is any more robust than the “race-to-the-top” theory described above.
IV. Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that nation’s largest accounting firms, which audit
virtually all U.S. publicly held companies, have not distinguished themselves from their
competitors by the quality of audit services, as measured by restatement rates. Perhaps
the highly concentrated nature of the accounting industry makes product differentiation
unnecessary but at some cost. Managers of large public companies who want to
distinguish themselves from their competitors by choosing a tough, high quality auditor
cannot do so. As measured by financial restatement rates, no such auditor is available:
one cannot reject the hypothesis that they all are the same.
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Note. The Figure’s components use client sales percentiles computed from all audit firms’ clients. The percentile breakpoints on the x-axes
therefore are the same across all firms.
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